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I. INTRODUCTION 
On November 23, 1988, about 9.5 million gallons of raw sewage 
poured into New Bedford Harbor in southeastern Massachusetts. 1 
A relay switch in New Bedford's antiquated sewage treatment plant 
had malfunctioned and caused a power outage.2 The disabled plant 
stored its sewage for four hours but then reached its storage capac-
ity. 3 At that point, untreated sewage simply overflowed directly into 
the harbor. 4 The spill added yet another chapter to New Bedford's 
long history of Clean Water Act5 (CWA) violations.6 
New Bedford's history illustrates the difficulty of maintaining com-
pliance with the CWA. Following thirteen years of noncompliance 
with federal water pollution standards,7 New Bedford finally had 
filed a consent decree8 with the United States Environmental Pro-
tection Agency (EPA) in federal district court in 1987, only one year 
before the sewage spill.9 Pursuant to this consent decree, New Bed-
ford had agreed to improve the operation of its present sewage plant 
and develop a schedule for the construction of a new plant. 10 The 
1988 sewage spill, however, reveals that New Bedford already has 
slipped from the schedule outlined in the 1987 consent decree. ll 
Financial constraints have contributed to New Bedford's delays in 
meeting the consent decree schedule. 12 The new treatment plant and 
the accompanying improvements carry a price tag of $500 million. 13 
New Bedford Mayor John Bullard has pointed out that this figure 
breaks down to a cost of $5000 per capita, the highest per capita 
cost in the nation. 14 The low income level of the city's inhabitants 
magnifies the impact of these enormous costS. 15 According to United 
States Census figures, New Bedford's 1987 per capita income stood 
1 Larry Tye, Sewage Floods Harbor in New Bedford, BOSTON GLOBE, Nov. 24, 1988, at 1. 
2 Id. at 46. 
3 See id. 
4 Id. 
5 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (1988). 
6 See Tye, supra note 1, at 46. 
7 United States v. City of New Bedford, No. 87-2498T, 1987 EPA Consent LEXIS 115, at 
*5 (D. Mass. Dec. 7, 1987). 
8 For a complete explanation of consent decrees, see infra notes 188-203 and accompanying 
text. 
9 City of New Beford, No. 87-2498T, 1987 EPA Consent LEXIS 115, at *1. 
10 Tye, supra note 1, at 46. 
11 See id. 
12 See James L. Franklin, New Bedford Tackling Costly Sewer Cleanup Job, BOSTON 
GLOBE, July 16, 1990, at 17. 
18 Id. 
14 Id. 
15 See id. at 20. 
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at only $9325, in contrast to the Massachusetts state average of 
$14,389. 16 
Despite New Bedford's limited financial resources, city officials 
voted in June 1990 to double the city's sewer rates to $100 per 
household. 17 Although many New Bedford residents consider these 
new rates to be exorbitant, city officials estimate that annual rates 
must be raised to $800 per household by 1995 to keep pace with 
skyrocketing costS. 18 Diminishing federal financial assistance and 
uncertainty surrounding the state loan program may leave New 
Bedford unable to pay for federally mandated improvements to its 
sewer system. 19 This scenario likely would result in additional fines20 
that would further cripple New Bedford's financial status. 21 As a 
result, Mayor Bullard hopes to persuade the EPA to extend the 
city's compliance schedule.22 The EPA, however, remains reluctant 
to alter the schedule.23 
New Bedford's problems are not unique. In 1989, the EPA re-
ported that over two-thirds of the nation's 15,600 wastewater treat-
ment plants failed to comply with CWA standards.24 EPA Adminis-
trator William K. Reilly conceded that the cost of the required 
improvements for these facilities would consume the entire amount 
of the EPA's $4.9 billion budget for the next seventeen years,25 a 
time span that extends well beyond the compliance deadlines for all 
of these treatment plants.26 Furthermore, approximately half of the 
municipalities served by noncompliant facilities are financially dis-
tressed and have per capita incomes that are less than seventy-five 
percent of the national average.27 According to Senator John D. 
Rockefeller IV of West Virginia, forcing these communities to com-
ply with the CW A without providing federal financial assistance 
16 [d. 
17 [d. 
18 Charles Stein, As SewU{Je Project Funds Sink, Mass. Budget Hole Deepens, BOSTON 
GLOBE, July 31, 1989, at 6. 
19 See id. 
20 See Tye, supra note 1, at 46 (New Bedford fined $150,000 for sewage treatment violations 
in 1987). 
21 See Franklin, supra note 12, at 20. 
22 [d. 
23 See id. 
24 Douglas Jehl, Clean Water Cost Put at $83.5 Billion, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 15, 1989, at A4. 
26 [d. 
26 Municipal Wastewater Construction Grant Amendments of 1981, § 21(a), 33 U.S.C. 
§ 131l(i) (1988). 
27 Se'WU{Je Treatment: Rockefeller to Propose Deadline Extension for Municipal Se'WU{Je 
Treatment Requirements, 19 Env't Rep. (BNA) 177 (June 3, 1988) [hereinafter Proposed 
Deadline Extension]. 
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would push many of them into bankruptcy.28 Moreover, not all com-
munities are as willing to make a good faith effort to comply with 
the CWA as New Bedford has been. 29 For example, Robbie Savage, 
executive director of the Association of State and Interstate Water 
Pollution Control Administrators, recalled a meeting where one local 
official stated: 
OK, I've read the law, I know what it says, I know what the 
state and federal government are requiring of me. And I'm not 
going to do it. I don't have the money, I don't have the support, 
I don't have the need in my community to do it. I'm just not 
going to do it. And by the time the EPA figures out I didn't do 
it and gets around to enforcing against me, I'll be dead.30 
The EPA faces difficult enforcement problems in bringing these 
financially distressed communities into compliance with the CW A. 
The agency has devised a strategy that favors the use of judicial 
action to compel compliance. 31 As a result, federal courts soon must 
adopt techniques to enforce previous federal court orders and con-
sent decrees mandating compliance with CWA requirements. 
In attempting to answer this question, Section II of this Comment 
begins by setting forth the various enforcement options contained in 
the CWA. Section II then explores both the indirect coercive tech-
niques that courts traditionally have employed to compel compliance 
with injunctions, as well as instances of more direct enforcement 
orders by courts in cases involving CWA violations. In Section III, 
this Comment concludes by evaluating various enforcement tech-
niques and proposing a course that courts should follow in enforcing 
orders against noncompliant publicly owned treatment works 
(POTWs). 
II. ENFORCEMENT OF THE CWA 
A. Statutory Provisions of the CWA 
Twenty years ago, the United States Congress addressed the 
growing national water pollution crisis by passing the Federal Water 
28 [d. 
29 See Franklin, supra note 12, at 20. 
30 Margaret E. Kriz, Effluent, Not Affluent, 21 NATL J. 740, 742 (1989). 
31 Enforcement; Thomas Puts in Place Enforcement Strategy to Maximize POTW Com-
pliance with '88 Deadline, 18 Env't Rep. (BNA) 1436, 1437 (Oct. 2, 1987) [hereinafter En-
forcement Strategy]. 
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Pollution Control Act Amendments (FWPCA) of 1972,32 commonly 
known as the CW A. The stated goal of the CW A is "to restore and 
maintain the chemical, physical and biological integrity of the Na-
tion's waters."33 The statute's success turns on the identification and 
regulation of effluent dischargers that are sources of pollution. 34 
POTW s represent roughly twenty-six percent of the nation's effluent 
dischargers.35 Accordingly, the CWA authorizes the EPA adminis-
trator to promulgate effluent standards with which all POTW s in 
the United States must comply.36 The original compliance deadline 
for POTWs was July 1, 1977. 37 Congress extended this deadline to 
July 1, 198338 and later to July 1, 1988.39 
To facilitate the enforcement of effluent standards, the CWA cre-
ated the National Pollution Discharge Elimination System 
(NPDES),40 a nationwide permitting system designed to regulate 
pollution discharges from a variety of sources including POTWs.4l 
Each NPDES permit sets forth the specific level of contaminants 
permissible in the discharge from a given facility.42 The EPA has 
broad discretion to prescribe whatever permit conditions are nec-
essary to ensure that dischargers carry out the provisions of the 
CWA.43 Accordingly, facilities need only comply with the effluent 
limitations set forth in their NPDES permit even though other 
sections of the CWA may call for higher standards. 44 
Upon receiving approval from the EPA administrator,45 states may 
administer discharge permit programs on their own. 46 Permit re-
32 Pub. L. No. 92-500, 86 Stat. 816 (codified as amended at 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (1988». 
33 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (1988). 
34 ld. § 1251(a)(5). 
35 Note, Regulation of Noncompliant Publicly Owned Treatment Works Under the Clean 
Water Act, 10 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 901, 904 (1984) [hereinafter Noncompliant Treatment 
Works]. 
36 33 U.S.C. § 1311(b)(1)(B) (1988). 
37 ld. § 1311(b)(1)(B}-(C). The 1977 amendments to the CWA included an additional pro-
vision to allow time extensions for municipalities. ld. § 1311(i). 
38 Clean Water Act of 1977, § 45, Pub. L. No. 95-217, 91 Stat. 1584 (current version at 33 
U.S.C. § 1311(i) (1988». 
39 Municipal Wastewater Construction Grant Amendments of 1981, § 21(a), 33 U.S.C. 
§ 1311(i) (1988). 
40 33 U.S.C. § 1342 (1988). 
41 ld. § 1342(a)(I). 
42 See id. Some effluent characteristics that the EPA may limit through NPDES permits 
include flow, biochemical oxygen demand, total suspended solids, settleable solids, and fecal 
coliform bacteria. See United States v. City of Providence, 492 F. Supp. 602, 607 (D.R.1. 
1980). 
43 33 U.S.C. § 1342(a)(1) (1988) . 
.. ld. § 1342(k) . 
.. ld. § 1342(a)(5) . 
.. ld. § 1342(b)(I). 
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quirements in states that have gained such authority remain sub-
stantially the same as the requirements under the federal NPDES 
program. 47 Furthermore, states also may assume enforcement re-
sponsibilities under the CWA.48 The £p A, however, retains its status 
as the ultimate enforcement authority. 49 
To encourage compliance with the NPDES requirements, the 
CWA provides the EPA with a broad range of enforcement options. 50 
The mildest statutory enforcement option available to the agency is 
to issue administrative orders. 51 Administrative orders may take the 
form of a notice of violation to a noncompliant POTW, a demand for 
compliance, or an extension of the POTW's compliance schedule. 52 
While administrative orders allow flexibility in facilitating compli-
ance,53 they often result in schedule extensions that cause additional 
delays in compliance. 54 Furthermore, many municipal officials in 
charge ofPOTWs view administrative orders as a method of avoiding 
judicial sanctions. 55 
A second enforcement option available to the EPA is to pursue 
injunctive relief. 56 Specifically, the EPA may seek a permanent or 
temporary injunction to correct any violation for which the agency 
is authorized to issue an administrative order. 57 Unlike administra-
tive orders, injunctions carry the advantage of being a judicially 
sanctioned enforcement option. 58 
Finally, the EPA may seek both civil59 and criminal60 penalties 
against noncompliant dischargers. The Water Quality Act of 198761 
set a maximum civil penalty of $25,000 per day62 and a maximum 
criminal penalty of $50,000 per day63 for as long as the violation 
47 Id. § 1342(a)(3). 
48 Id. § 1342(b)(7). 
49 Id. § 1319(a)(3). 
50 See id. § 1319. 
51 I d. § 1319(a)(2)(A). 
62 Noncompliant Treatment Works, supra note 35, at 930. 
63 Id. 
54 See Sewage Treatment: War Against Municipal Sewage Pollution Not Yet Over, Accord-
ing to NRDC Attorney, 19 Env't Rep. (BNA) 462, 462 (Aug. 5, 1988). 
55 Noncompliant Treatment Works, supra note 35, at 931. 
56 33 U.S.C. § 1319(b) (1988). 
67 Id. 
68 See Enforcement Strategy, supra note 31, at 1437. 
69 33 U.S.C. § 1319(d) (1988). 
60 Id. § 1319(c). 
61 Pub. L. No. 100-4, 101 Stat. 7 (codified as amended at 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (1988». 
62 33 U.S.C. § 1319(d) (1988). 
63 Id. § 1319(c). 
1992] COMPELLING CWA COMPLIANCE 771 
persists. Attempts to fine noncompliant POTW s, however, often 
result in placing an additional burden on the municipality's taxpayers 
rather than punishing the municipal or state officials responsible for 
the violations. 64 
Using the options available, the EPA develops enforcement strat-
egies and distributes those strategies to its ten regional offices and 
to state enforcement authorities. 65 For example, in 1984, to speed 
up POTW compliance with the 1988 deadline, the EPA developed 
the National Municipal Policy (NMP).66 The general goal of this 
policy was to have all noncompliant POTWs working on enforceable 
compliance schedules by the end of fiscal year 1985.67 The NMP 
spelled out the EPA's scheduling requirements both for facilities in 
existence at the time and for facilities to be constructed. 68 
Since 1987, the EPA has conducted its enforcement efforts pri-
marily through the use of judicial action. 69 Specifically, the EPA 
enters into court-sanctioned consent decrees70 with noncompliant 
communities. The terms of these consent decrees generally set forth 
a mandatory schedule of compliance,71 and a POTW that is unable 
to meet the compliance schedule outlined in a consent decree risks 
being found in contempt of court. 72 Numerous communities that have 
entered into consent decrees with the EPA have experienced sched-
ule slippage73 placing them in violation of a court order. 74 The EPA 
now must seek the enforcement of these prior court orders75 by 
asking the courts to direct the noncomplying communities or states76 
to appropriate and expend public funds, by a bond issue or tax levy. 
64 Noncompliant Treatment Works, supra note 35, at 926; see also United States v. City 
of Providence, 492 F. Supp. 602, 610 (D.R.I. 1980). 
65 Enforcement Strategy, supra note 31, at 1436. 
66 49 Fed. Reg. 3832 (1984). 
67 Id. 
68 Id. 
69 Enforcement Strategy, supra note 31, at 1437. 
70 See Noncompliant Treatment Works, supra note 35, at 931. Consent decrees are agree-
ments, negotiated by the parties in dispute, that the court sanctions and enforces. Id. at 931 
n.195. 
71 Id. at 931. 
72 Id. 
13 See, e.g., Tye, supra note 1, at 46. 
74 See id. 
75 Because of the provision allowing for state permitting and enforcement under the CWA, 
33 U.S.C. § 1342(b), there currently are court orders outstanding in both federal and state 
courts. See Enforcement Strategy, supra note 31, at 1437. 
76 To the degree that existing state law prevents a noncompliant community from raising 
sufficient funds, the CWA provides for state liability where a civil judgment has been rendered 
against the community. 33 U.S.C. § 1319(e) (1988). 
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B. Shifting the Financial Burden/rom the Federal Government to 
State and Local Entities 
1. The Historical Decline of Federal Financial Assistance 
The costs of constructing and maintaining water and sewer treat-
ment facilities are staggering. For example, the cleanup of Boston 
Harbor alone will cost over $6 billion.77 The EPA estimates that the 
overall cost of upgrading the nation's sewage treatment facilities to 
bring them into compliance with federal standards will exceed $83.5 
billion. 78 
Congress recognized the severe financial burden that requiring 
construction of new treatment works places on communities. As a 
result, the CWA states that "it is the national policy that Federal 
financial assistance be provided to construct publicly owned treat-
ment works. "79 Pursuant to this policy, Title II of the 1972 CWA 
created a comprehensive federal construction grants program.8O Con-
gress initially planned for the federal government to cover seventy-
five percent of the cost of the construction of new POTW s. 81 Since 
the enactment of the CWA in 1972, however, the program has been 
marked by a series of reductions in federal assistance to state and 
local governments. 82 
Following the passage of the 1972 CWA amendments over his 
veto, President Richard M. Nixon impounded a portion of the au-
thorized federal grant money in each of the following two fiscal 
years.83 President Nixon directed the administrator of the EPA to 
disburse to the states only $2 billion of th~ $5 billion authorized for 
fiscal year 1973 and $3 billion of the $6 billion authorized for fiscal 
year 1974.84 In addition, the administrator allotted only $4 billion of 
the $7 billion authorized for fiscal year 1975.85 Although the United 
States Supreme Court ordered the release of the impounded funds 
in fiscal year 1976,86 the series of impoundments had the effect of 
causing significant delays in the disbursement of federal grant 
71 Tye, supra note I, at 46. 
78 Jehl, supra note 24, at 4. 
'" 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(4) (1988). 
80 [d. §§ 1281-1299. 
81 Train v. City of New York, 420 U.S. 35, 37~ (1975). 
82 See infra notes 83-94 and accompanying text. 
83 State Water Control Bd. v. Train, 569 F.2d 921, 924 n.lS (4th Cir. 1977). 
84 [d. 
85 [d. 
116 Train v. City of New York, 420 U.S. 35, 40-41 (1975). 
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money.87 A cumbersome EPA grant approval process amplified these 
delays. 88 
The Municipal Wastewater Treatment Construction Grant Amend-
ments of 198189 effectively reduced federal funding to only $2.4 billion 
annually for fiscal years 1980 to 1985. 90 Moreover, the 1987 amend-
ments to the CWA 91 essentially phased out the grants program 
between fiscal years 1987 and 1990.92 Beyond fiscal year 1990, the 
only federal financial assistance available has been in the form of 
seed money for state revolving loan funds,93 and this assistance is 
expected to be eliminated by 1994.94 
2. The New Financial Burden on State Revolving Loan Funds and 
the Increase in Local Contributions 
Mter the 1987 amendments, funding efforts under the CWA 
shifted from the provision of federal grants to the establishment of 
federal/state revolving loan funds. 95 These funds provide federal and 
state seed grants96 to leverage state and municipal bond issuances. 97 
State loan fund programs invest the federal seed money, and the 
returns on these investments subsidize the interest costs of munic-
ipal bond issuers sponsored by the state programs.98 The reserves 
that investing the seed grant money creates also serve to bolster 
the credit ratings of municipalities that issue bonds leveraged against 
the state fund. 99 These improved credit ratings allow communities 
to lower their overall borrowing costs. 100 Finally, states often set 
aside a portion of the fund to provide low-interest state loans directly 
to municipalities that do not have easy access to credit markets. 101 
87 State Water Control Bd., 559 F.2d at 924. 
88 See Noncompliant Treatment Works, supra note 35, at 909-11. 
89 Pub. L. No. 97-117, 95 Stat. 1623 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 33 U.S.C. 
§§ 1251-1387 (1988». 
90 33 U.S.C. § 1287 (1988). 
91 Water Quality Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-4, 101 Stat. 7 (codified as amended at 33 
U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (1988». 
92 33 U.S.C. §§ 1291-1292 (1988). 
93 Id. §§ 1381-1387. 
94 Proposed Deadline Extension, supra note 27, at 177. 
95 Kriz, supra note 30, at 740. 
96 Patrice Hill, New York State Offers $166.5 Million Issue to Clean Water Around New 
York City, BOND BUYER, May 18, 1990, at 2. For example, seed grants for New York's 
revolving fund are expected to total $1 billion. [d. 
97 Id. 
9B Id. 
99 Id. 
100 Id. 
101 Patrice Hill, EPA Approves Grant for New York State to Set Up Largest Clean Water 
Fund, BOND BUYER, Mar. 29, 1990, at 1. 
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The revolving loan fund program, however, experienced a slow 
start due to administrative complications. 102 The EPA employs a 
cumbersome letter-of-credit system to make federal seed payments 
under the program. 103 Thus far only two states, Minnesota and New 
York, have secured from the EPA an "aggressive leveraging ex-
emption" allowing the states to bypass the system and receive cash 
quickly.104 Unfortunately, the revolving fund program has yet to 
receive the full amount of annual funding provided for by the law. 105 
Finally, Congress has failed to provide federal tax relief for state 
and local bond issuers. 106 Under the present system, state revolving 
funds cannot distribute bond proceeds rapidly enough to qualify for 
the federal tax law's arbitrage rebate relief provision. 107 
Potential problems with the revolving fund program also exist on 
the state side of the equation. lOB As of May 31, 1990, only ten states 
had implemented revolving fund programs. 109 Many states, such as 
Massachusetts, already are saddled with enormous debt service costs 
and plummeting credit ratings. l1O These states sometimes choose to 
employ escalating-payment plans to postpone their debt charges on 
state bonds issued under a revolving fund until future years.111 As 
a result, these states will face the dual burden of paying enormous 
debt service costs for new projects at the same time that grant-
subsidized projects completed in the 1970s become antiquated and 
require upgrading. 112 Accordingly, financing problems that contrib-
ute to POTW noncompliance with the CWA likely will not be erad-
icated through the revolving fund program in the foreseeable future. 
C. Challenges to CWA Enforcement Based on the Lack of Federal 
Financing 
Despite dwindling amounts of federal financial assistance, courts 
repeatedly have required local governments to comply with the CWA 
102 Hill, supra note 96, at 2. 
103 Hill, supra note 101, at l. 
104 [d. 
105 Hill, supra note 96, at 2. 
106 See Patrice Hill, Congress Not Expected to Provide Aid, Tax Relieffor Environmental 
Systems, BOND BUYER, Mar. 12, 1990, at 2. 
107 [d. 
108 See Charles Stein, Debt Payments Swamping Mass., BOSTON GLOBE, Dec. 7, 1989, at 
2l. 
109 Ted Hampton, Massachusetts Plan for Revolving Fund May Ease MWRA's Borrowing 
Needs, BOND BUYER, May 31, 1990, at l. 
llO See Stein, supra note 108, at 2l. 
III Larry Tye, Towns Gird for Rising Sewer Costs, BOSTON GLOBE, July 30, 1989, at 25, 
27. 
ll2 See Kriz, supra note 30, at 740. 
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even when the EPA has failed to provide federal funding. 113 In the 
landmark decision of State Water Control Board v. Train,114 the 
United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit held that 
municipal compliance with the CWA effluent standards is not contin-
gent upon the receipt of federal financial assistance. 115 In Train, the 
commonwealth of Virginia had sought a declaratory judgment ex-
empting from the effluent limitations of section 301(b)(1)(B) of the 
CWA POTW s that did not receive federal construction grants. 116 
Virginia argued that the legislative history of the CWA implies a 
link between the statute's enforceability and the timely award of 
federal assistance. 117 The court, however, pointed out that Congress 
expressly had refused to insert any blanket exemption into the leg-
islation and, therefore, did not intend to allow any exceptions from 
the established deadline. 118 In dicta, the court anticipated that the 
EPA would not bring enforcement proceedings against "municipali-
ties who, despite good faith efforts, are economically or physically 
unable to comply" with the statutory deadline. 119 Given the EPA's 
recent enforcement strategy favoring judicial enforcement,120 this 
anticipation appears to have been somewhat misplaced. 
The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reiter-
ated the notion that the CWA's compliance and funding provisions 
are independent in United States v. City of Detroit. 121 In this case, 
Detroit and the EPA entered into a consent decree that called for 
the construction of approximately $100 million in major capital im-
provements to the existing treatment facilities. 122 In order to comply 
with the consent decree, Detroit sought to secure federal funding 
for the project.123 Although federal money allotted to Michigan was 
available at the time and Detroit's projects were eligible for fund-
ing,124 it became obvious that Detroit would not be able to meet 
certain EPA criteria for obligation. 125 Because Detroit would be 
113 See infra notes 114-67 and accompanying text. 
114 559 F.2d 921 (4th Cir. 1977). 
116 [d. at 924. 
116 [d. at 922. 
117 [d. at 924. 
118 [d. at 925-26. 
119 [d. at 927. 
120 See Enforcement Strategy, supra note 31, at 1437. 
121 720 F.2d 443, 451 (6th Cir. 1983). 
122 [d. at 445. 
123 [d. 
124 See id. at 446-47 (discussing the specific procedure for securing federal construction 
grant money). 
126 [d. at 447. "Obligation" refers to the process whereby federal funds allotted to a state 
become usable for approved projects within that state. See id. at 446-47. 
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unable to meet these requirements before the expiration of the fiscal 
year, the money that was currently available would be subject to 
reallotment by the EPA administrator and subsequently might not 
be available in the following fiscal year. 126 
To prevent the loss of federal funds, Detroit petitioned the district 
court to reserve the available federal funds for use on its projects 
and to enjoin the administrator from reallotting those funds. 127 The 
district court subsequently granted an order reserving the funds for 
Detroit. 128 When the EPA alloted federal funds in the following fiscal 
year, Michigan moved that the district court modify its order to 
allow the funding for the Detroit projects to come from the new 
allotment. 129 The EPA and the county of Muskegon, whose projects 
would have been the beneficiaries of the reallotment that the district 
court's order barred, joined Michigan's motion. 130 Muskegon asserted 
that the district court lacked authority to "lasso" federal funds in 
the first place. 131 
In deciding City of Detroit, the Sixth Circuit touched upon three 
important principles that arise during judicial interaction with the 
CWA. The court held that lower court decisions affecting federal 
funding under the CWA can be subject to review by appellate courts 
despite the fact that the statute's one-year funding mechanism often 
renders the question moot. 132 The court also reinforced the holding 
of State Water Control Board v. Trainl33 that compliance with the 
CWA was not contingent upon federal funding. l34 Finally, the Sixth 
Circuit stated that although the district court's order achieved the 
commendable objective of providing Detroit with desparately needed 
126 See id. 
127 [d. at 445. 
128 [d. at 447. 
129 [d. at 448. 
130 [d. 
131 [d. 
132 See id. at 449-50. The CWA requires the administrator of the EPA to reallot all 
unobligated funds at the expiration of the fiscal year. [d. at 446 (construing 33 U.S.C. 
§ 1285(b)(1) (1988». In City of Detroit, the district court's "lasso" order occurred only 14 days 
prior to the close of the 1981 fiscal year. [d. at 449. Therefore, no matter how diligently 
Muskegon pursued judicial review of the order, there was no possibility that a court could 
accomplish such a review prior to the end of the one-year funding mechanism. [d. At the end 
of the 1981 fiscal year, allotments for fiscal year 1982 would begin, thus rendering the question 
of impoundment of the 1981 funds moot. See id. Under the year-to-year funding system, the 
maximum period for judicial review of a district court order of this nature is necessarily one 
year. [d. at 450. 
133 559 F.2d 921, 924 (4th Cir. 1977). 
134 City of Detroit, 720 F.2d at 451. 
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federal financial assistance, such an order is unjustified because it 
breaches the constitutional separation of powers between the 
branches of government by directing the EPA to violate its statutory 
duty to reallot unused funds immediately. 135 The court therefore held 
that the district court was without authority to issue its order. 136 
Recent decisions also demonstrate the tendency of courts to avoid 
interfering with the EPA's administration of federal funds. In Sac-
ramento Regional County Sanitation District v. Reilly,137 the EPA 
required the plaintiff, a county sanitation district, to purchase mit-
igation wetlands as part of a construction project for a new treatment 
facility.l38 Although the EPA initially awarded a grant to cover the 
purchase of the mitigation wetlands, the agency later disallowed the 
grant, claiming that it did not have authority under the CWA to 
award a grant for such purposes. 139 The United States Court of 
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit ruled in favor of the EPA, holding 
that the terms "construction"140 and "treatment works,"141 which 
define the eligibility for grants under the CW A, did not encompass 
the purchase of the wetlands. 142 
Similarly, in City of Mount Clemens v. EPA,143 the United States 
Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit upheld the district court's 
denial of Mount Clemens's motion to compel federal funding .144 
Mount Clemens had sought federal funding for a local treatment 
plant that appeared eligible for funding based on a "cost-effective-
ness analysis" that the city had completed. 145 The EPA, however, 
denied funding on the grounds that constructing a regional treatment 
plant was a more "cost-effective" alternative despite the results of 
the city's analysis. 146 The Sixth Circuit endorsed the EPA's definition 
of "cost-effectiveness" and upheld the its denial of federal financial 
assistance. 147 
135 Id. 
136 Id. 
137 905 F.2d 1262 (9th Cir. 1990). 
138 Id. at 1265. 
139 Id. at 1266. 
140 33 U.S.C. § 1292(1) (1988). 
141 I d. § 1292(2). 
142 Sacramento Regional County Sanitation Dist., 905 F.2d at 1270-71. 
143 917 F.2d 908 (6th Cir. 1990). 
144 Id. at 918. The CWA provides that grants may be awarded only to the most cost-
effective project in a given area. 33 U.S.C. § 1298 (1988). 
145 City of Mount Clemens, 917 F.2d at 910. 
146 Id. at 912. 
147 Id. at 918. 
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Despite the general reluctance to compel financing, however, some 
courts have issued direct funding orders for treatment works proj-
ects. For example, in Inverness Forest Improvement District v. 
Hardy Street Investors,148 private land owners claimed that the de-
fendant, the Inverness Forest Improvement District, had discrimi-
nated against them by refusing to supply water utilities to their 
land. 149 The lower court granted an injunction to the plaintiffs. The 
injunction ordered Inverness to sell municipal bonds, which already 
had received voter approval, and use the proceeds to construct the 
necessary projects to supply water utilities to the plaintiffs' land. 150 
The court also enjoined Inverness from using the proceeds of the 
bonds on any project other than the expansion of water utilities to 
the plaintiffs' land. 151 
On appeal, the Court of Civil Appeals of Texas held that the lower 
court lacked authority to issue a permanent injunction requiring the 
allocation of the bond proceeds toward specific projects. 152 Never-
theless, the appeals court agreed with the plaintiffs' discrimination 
claims and sustained the trial court's power to compel Inverness to 
provide the necessary utilities to the plaintiffs' land. 153 Accordingly, 
while the trial court could not enjoin the use of the bond proceeds 
for other projects, it could enjoin their use until Inverness developed 
and implemented a plan to end the discriminatory practices. l54 Al-
though this case did not arise under the CWA, it illustrates one 
court's willingness to channel the proceeds of a bond issuance to fund 
a treatment project. 
In the recent case of Michigan v. City of Allen Park, 155 the United 
States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan granted 
Allen Park's motion to compel EPA funding for the city's treatment 
works project. 156 The EPA and the Michigan Department of Natural 
Resources (MDNR) had tendered grants for the construction of a 
new sewer system for Allen Park. 157 These grants accounted for 
eighty percent of the total cost of the project.158 In 1980, the district 
court ordered Allen Park to supply funding for only the remaining 
148 541 s. W.2d 454 (Tex. Civ. App. 1976). 
149 [d. at 456. 
150 [d. 
151 [d. at 460. 
152 [d. at 461. 
153 [d. 
154 [d. at 463. 
155 739 F. Supp. 1102 (E.D. Mich. 1990). 
155 [d. at 1107. 
157 [d. at 1104. 
158 [d. 
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twenty percent of the total cost and to begin construction of the 
project.159 After some delays, the district court entered a detailed 
schedule of compliance for Allen Park. 160 The city complied with this 
order, but the EPA and MDNR balked at providing the necessary 
funds. 161 Allen Park argued that this failure to provide funding vio-
lated the previous court order,162 while the EPA and MDNR argued 
that federal courts have no authority to compel such funding and 
cited the Sixth Circuit's decision in United States v. City of Detroit 
to support their position. 163 
In holding that it did have the authority to compel funding, the 
district court pointed to the broad range of equitable powers at a 
court's disposal to enforce its orders and judgments.l64 The court 
determined that because its prior orders encompassed EPA and 
MDNR funding, the EPA and MDNR had an ongoing obligation to 
comply with those orders. 165 As a result, the court granted Allen 
Park's motion to compel funding from both the MDNR and the 
EPA. 166 The result in Allen Park, however, represents a fact-specific 
exception to a general trend that disfavors direct orders. 167 
D. Techniques for Enforcing .[udicial CWA Compliance Orders 
To avoid issuing direct orders to fund municipal compliance with 
the CWA, courts have adopted certain indirect coercive techniques 
to compel compliance: sequestration of funds, sewer moratoriums, 
receiverships, and contempt proceedings. 
1. Structural Injunctions in General 
Courts traditionally have employed a variety of coercive tech-
niques to enforce court orders known as "structural injunctions. "168 
A structural injunction is a court order aimed at preventing a gov-
169 Id. 
160 Id. 
161 Id. at 1105. 
162 Id. 
163 Id. For a discussion of United States v. City of Detroit, see supra notes 121--S6 and 
accompanying text. 
164 Michigan v. City of Allen Park, 739 F. Supp. 1102, 1106 (E.D. Mich. 1990). The courts' 
broad range of equitable powers includes "inherent power to enter such orders as may be 
necessary to effectuate their lawful decrees and to prevent interference with, and obstruction 
to, their implementation." United States v. Wallace, 218 F. Supp. 290, 292 (N.D. Ala. 1963). 
166 City of Allen Park, 739 F. Supp. at 1106. 
166 Id. at 1107. 
167 See infra notes 204-76 and accompanying text. 
168 See James M. Hirschhorn, Where the Money Is: Remedies to Finance Compliance with 
Strict Structural Injunctions, 82 MICH. L. REV. 1815, 1824--S5 (1984). 
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ernmental unit from depriving members of a plaintiff class of certain 
rightS. 169 Historically, courts have used structural injunctions in 
cases where a governmental entity has deprived a plaintiff class of 
a constitutional right.170 The governmental institution involved typ-
ically has the responsibility of providing some type of service to a 
dependent plaintiff class;171 as a result, injunctions of this type often 
arise in situations involving schools, prisons, and mental hospitals. 172 
Structural injunctions generally provide relief through a reorga-
nization of the offending government institution to provide services 
without infringing on plaintiffs' rightS. 173 These reorganization or-
ders often carry with them heavy financial burdens for the govern-
mental unit involved. 174 Controversies over structural injunctions 
arise when a lack of financial resources impedes the government's 
ability to comply with the injunction. 175 Courts have adopted various 
methods indirectly to combat financially based noncompliance. 176 
Injunctions under the CWA differ in certain ways from traditional 
structural injunctions. In most cases requiring compliance with the 
CWA, there is no deprivation of a constitutional right. Additionally, 
despite the CWA provision allowing citizens suits,177 enforcement of 
the statute generally is entrusted to the EPA,178 not a plaintiff class. 
Injunctions under the CWA, however, are similar to traditional 
structural injunctions in that they often take the form of consent 
decrees and call for the reorganization of a governmental institution, 
namely, a treatment facility.179 Furthermore, in Weinberger v. Rom-
ero-Barcelo,l80 the Supreme Court held that the statutory scheme of 
the CWA places no limits on a court's traditional equitable discretion 
to prescribe injunctive relief in a case brought under the statute. 181 
In Romero-Barcelo, United States Navy pilots engaged in training 
maneuvers off the coast of Puerto Rico accidentally missed land 
169 [d. at 1817. 
170 See id. 
171 [d. at 1818. 
172 [d. For example, prison inmates have brought suit against prison officials to correct 
conditions in prisons, such as insufficient food and medical care, that allegedly violated their 
Eighth Amendment right of freedom from cruel and unusual punishment. [d. at 1817. 
173 See id. at 1817-18. 
174 [d. at 1823. 
175 See id. at 1819. 
176 See infra notes 204-76 and accompanying text. 
177 33 U.S.C. § 1365 (1988). 
178 See id. § 1319. 
179 See infra notes 188-203 and accompanying text. 
180 456 U.S. 305 (1982). 
181 [d. at 320. 
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targets and bombed the surrounding waters.182 As a result, the 
governor of Puerto Rico and others sued to enjoin the Navy opera-
tions because of CWA violations. 183 The United States District Court 
for the District of Puerto Rico held that the bombing was a discharge 
of pollutants and constituted a violation of the CWA because the 
Navy had not obtained an NPDES permit. l84 The court ordered the 
Navy to obtain an NPDES permit but, in exercising its equitable 
discretion, refused to enjoin the Navy operations in the meantime. 185 
The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit vacated 
the district court's order and remanded with instructions to order 
the Navy to cease operations. l86 In reversing the First Circuit, the 
Supreme Court concluded that the CWA allowed the district court 
to order whatever relief it deemed necessary to ensure compliance 
with the CWA.187 Accordingly, many of the coercive techniques that 
courts use to compel compliance with traditional structural injunc-
tions they also may use to compel compliance with the CWA. 
2. The Modification of Consent Decrees 
Before applying coercive techniques to compel compliance with a 
structural injunction, courts sometimes are asked unilaterally to 
modify an existing consent decree. 188 In United States v. City of 
Providence,189 however, the United States District Court for the 
District of Rhode Island held that any departure from the terms of 
a consent decree "must be based upon solid reason. "190 The court 
explained that there are two facets to a consent decree. A consent 
decree is a decree of the court and therefore carries with it the 
weight normally attached to a judicial sanction. 191 In addition, a 
182 Id. at 307. 
183 Id. at 307-08. 
184 Id. at 309. 
185 Id. at 310. The district court determined that the Navy ordnance discharges caused no 
actual harm to the waters, and decided therefore not to enjoin the Navy operations. In 
justifying its use of discretion, the district court quoted language from an earlier case stating 
that "[t]he historic injunctive process was designed to deter, not to punish." Id. (quoting 
Hecht v. Bowles, 321 U.S. 321, 329--30 (1944». 
186 Id. The First Circuit held that the CWA imposed an absolute statutory obligation on 
the district court to order the Navy to cease operations until it obtained a permit from the 
EPA. The First Circuit also noted that the president has the power to exempt the Navy from 
CWA requirements in the interest of national security if necessary. Id. at 311. 
187 Id. at 320. 
188 See, e.g., United States v. City of Providence, 492 F. Supp. 602, 608 (D.R.I. 1980). 
189 492 F. Supp. 602 (D.R.I. 1980). 
190 Id. at 609. 
191 Id. 
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consent decree is an agreement, freely entered into by the involved 
parties, that binds those parties to certain terms. 192 
In determining the limited situations in which a court may modify 
a consent decree, the City of Providence court followed the prece-
dent set in United States v. Swift & CO.I93 In Swift, the Supreme 
Court held that a moving party must satisfy two requirements to 
justify the modification of a consent decree. l94 The modification must 
relate prospectively and not relate to "rights fully accrued upon facts 
so nearly permanent as to be substantially impervious to change. "195 
Moreover, the court must believe that because of changing circum-
stances, the original consent decree has become an "instrument of 
wrong. "196 
The City of Providence court applied the Swift test to the facts of 
its case. 197 The city of Providence unilaterally sought to modify the 
terms of a consent decree into which it had entered with the EPA 
and the state environmetal agency concerning Providence's waste-
water treatment plant.198 Providence had failed to comply with ef-
fluent limitations prior to the date that the consent decree had 
specified. 199 The court first determined that modification of the con-
sent decree failed the first requirement of the Swift test because it 
"would alter rights essentially accrued at the time" rather than act 
in a purely prospective manner. 2OO The court further pointed out that 
the city would suffer no "wrong" as a result of the court's refusal to 
modify a consent decree that already had afforded Providence relief 
from other penalties,2°1 such as statutory fines. 202 Finally, the court 
noted that modification of the consent decree would "serve no useful 
purpose" because Providence could not determine when, if ever, it 
would be able to comply with the decree's terms.203 The City of 
192 [d. 
193 286 U.S. 106 (1932). 
194 See id. at 114-15. 
195 [d. at 114. 
195 [d. at 114-15. 
197 United States v. City of Providence, 492 F. Supp. 602, 609 (D.R.1. 1980). 
198 [d. at 604. 
199 [d. at 607. 
200 [d. at 609. Providence's motion to modify the consent decree was filed just two days 
prior to the decree's expiration deadline. Accordingly, the rights to which the EPA was 
entitled-namely, the city's compliance with CWA standards-had essentially accrued. [d. 
201 [d. 
202 For a discussion of provisions for fines under the CWA, see supra notes 59-64 and 
accompanying text. 
203 United States v. City of Providence, 492 F. Supp. 602, 609 (D.R.1. 1980). 
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Providence opinion illustrates judicial reluctance to modify consent 
decrees. 
3. Sequestration 
In light of the difficulty of modifying consent decrees, courts have 
looked to indirect coercive techniques to compel compliance with 
their orders. One coercive method that courts utilize to compel com-
pliance with structural injunctions is the sequestration, or withhold-
ing, of other funds to which the violator otherwise would be enti-
tled. 204 A classic example of sequestration is Delaware Valley 
Citizens' Council v. Pennsylvania. 205 In this case, the common-
wealth of Pennsylvania entered into a consent decree with the EPA 
pursuant to the Clean Air Act206 (CAA) to establish a program for 
the inspection and maintenance of automobile emissions systems. 207 
The Pennsylvania legislature, however, refused to appropriate the 
necessary money to fund this program. 208 The United States District 
Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania ordered the Secretary 
of Transportation of the United States to withhold federal highway 
funds for areas of Pennsylvania that the consent decree covered. 209 
In affirming the district court order, the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Third Circuit noted that spending the sequestered 
funds on highways would contribute directly to the problems the 
CAA sought to combat, and that withholding these funds was an 
especially appropriate means of compelling compliance.21o Further-
more, the state legislature easily could rectify any collateral harm 
that Pennsylvania's driving public suffered through the appropria-
tion of funds necessary to comply with the consent decree. 211 
Sometimes, however, consideration of potential collateral harm 
prevents the use of sequestration as a coercive technique. In Gau-
treaux v. Romney,212 the United States District Court for the N orth-
ern District of Illinois ordered the Secretary of Housing and Urban 
Development to withhold $26 million in federal funds from Chicago 
until the Chicago Housing Authority complied with the terms of a 
204 See Hirschhorn, supra note 168, at 1846-49. 
206 678 F.2d 470 (3d Cir. 1982). 
206 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7642 (1988). 
207 Delaware Valley Citizens' Council, 678 F.2d at 472. 
208 [d. at 473. 
209 [d. at 474. 
210 [d. at 478. 
211 [d. at 478-79. 
212 457 F.2d 124 (7th Cir. 1972). 
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consent decree into which it previously had entered. 213 In Gautreaux, 
the original court order required the Chicago Housing Authority to 
construct new public housing to combat existing discriminatory hous-
ing practices.214 On appeal, however, the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reversed the district court's se-
questration of Chicago's federal funds. 215 The Seventh Circuit rea-
soned that because the federal funds being withheld supported ac-
tivities that were distinct from those addressed by the original court 
order, there was an insufficient connection between the sequestered 
funds and the violation to justify the sequestration.216 Furthermore, 
according to the Seventh Circuit, the loss to the beneficiaries of the 
withheld funds outweighed any positive coercive effect on the city 
of Chicago. 217 Courts have not yet used sequestration to combat 
CWA violations. 
4. Shutdowns and Moratoriums 
One particularly severe coercive sanction is simply to shut down 
a noncompliant institution altogether.218 In New York State Associ-
ationfor Retarded Children v. Carey,219 the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Second Circuit indicated that shutting down a non-
compliant state institution would be preferable to dictating to citi-
zens of that state the ways in which they are to spend public funds. 220 
Despite the sentiment expressed in this case, however, courts often 
threaten shutdowns but seldom actually pursue them. 221 
This technique would be particularly uneffective in the context of 
shutting down noncompliant treatment facilities under the CWA.222 
Closing such a facility in most cases would leave residents of the 
noncompliant municipality without any water utilities. 223 Accord-
ingly, closing such facilities would jeopardize seriously the health 
213 [d. at 126. 
214 [d. at 129--30 (Sprecher, J., dissenting). 
215 [d. at 129. 
216 See id. at 126. The original court order concerned the construction oflow-income housing, 
whereas the sequestered funds would have been used for educational and job-training pro-
grams, health care centers, and other related activities, but not for housing of any kind. [d. 
217 See id. at 128. 
218 See Hirschhorn, supra note 168, at 1849. 
219 631 F.2d 162 (2d Cir. 1980). 
220 See id. at 165. 
221 See Hirschhorn, supra note 168, at 1849. 
222 See Noncompliant Treatment Works, supra note 35, at 927-28. 
223 [d. at 927. 
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and welfare of that community.224 As a result, rather than shutting 
down an entire treatment facility, some courts have opted to order 
moratoriums on new sewer connections. 225 
A court-ordered sewer moratorium prevents a noncompliant mu-
nicipality from accepting additional hookups to its existing sewer 
system. Recently, in United States v. Metropolitan District Com-
mission,226 the United States District Court for the District of Mas-
sachusetts granted the EPA an injunction that imposed a morato-
rium on sewer connections in forty-three cities and towns whose 
water and sewer needs the Massachusetts Water Resources Au-
thority (MWRA) manages. 227 A previous order by the same court 
had charged the MWRA with the cleanup of Boston Harbor.228 Part 
of the previous order required the MWRA to adopt a program to 
deal with residuals management. 229 The program created a need for 
the MWRA to secure a landfill site and, in turn, required the Mas-
sachusetts legislature to vote to transfer the land for the landfill to 
the MWRA.230 The legislature's repeated delays in transferring the 
land jeopardized the court-ordered compliance schedule for the Bos-
ton Harbor cleanup. 231 
As a result, United States District Judge A. David Mazzone or-
dered a moratorium on new sewer connections throughout the 
MWRA region. Judge Mazzone indicated several advantages to this 
form of remedy.232 He first observed that, from a logical standpoint, 
an entity that falls behind schedule in eliminating pollution should 
not be allowed, at the same time, to increase pollution through 
additional sewer connections.233 Furthermore, he noted that a mor-
atorium order preserved the court's policy of avoiding involvement 
224 Id. at 927-28. 
225 See, e.g., United States v. Metropolitan Dist. Comm'n, 757 F. Supp. 121, 130 (D. Mass. 
1991), aff'd, 930 F.2d 132 (1st Cir. 1991). 
226 757 F. Supp. 121 (D. Mass. 1991), aff'd, 930 F.2d 132 (1st Cir. 1991). 
227 Id. at 122-23. 
228 See generally United States v. Metropolitan Dist. Comm'n, 23 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 
1350 (D. Mass. 1985). 
229 Metropolitan Dist. Comm'n, 757 F. Supp. at 123. Residuals management refers to the 
process of disposing of the solid waste deposits that remain after the treatment of sewage 
water.ld. 
230 Id. at 124. The MWRA selected a landfill site in the town of Walpole, Massachusetts. 
The selection generated a great deal of opposition from Walpole residents. The residents 
placed a great deal of pressure on state legislators, resulting in numerous postponements of 
the vote to transfer the land to the MWRA. Id. at 124-25. 
231 I d. at 125. 
232 Id. at 129. 
233 Id. 
786 ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS [Vol. 19:765 
in substantive decisionmaking by merely providing an incentive to 
maintain the compliance schedule. 234 Finally, Judge Mazzone ex-
plained that because Congress explicitly has authorized moratorium 
orders,235 the order circumvented the federalism issues involved with 
a direct court order to transfer the land. 236 
Individuals affected by sewer moratoriums have challenged them 
unsuccessfully on constitutional grounds. In Peduto v. City of North 
Wildwood,237 condominium developers challenged a sewer morato-
rium and construction ban that the New Jersey Department of En-
vironmental Protection and the city of North Wildwood had imposed, 
on the grounds that the moratorium and ban constituted an uncon-
stitutional taking of land and violated due process. 238 The Cape May 
County Court dismissed the developers' complaint.239 The developers 
did not appeal this decision and instead filed a separate action in 
federal district court.240 The United States Court of Appeals for the 
Third Circuit subsequently affirmed the district court's dismissal of 
the developers' complaint on res judicata grounds. 241 
Similarly, in E & T Realty v. Strickland,242 the implementation of 
a sewer moratorium withstood a challenge on Fourteenth Amend-
ment grounds. 243 The plaintiff, E & T Realty, claimed that the J ef-
ferson County Sewer Moratorium Committee had violated the Equal 
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment when it denied the 
plaintiff's building a permit for sewer allocation but granted a similar 
permit to a building just a few blocks away.244 According to the 
United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, the lower 
court erred in holding that the permit denial violated the Equal 
Protection Clause because E & T Realty failed to show that the two 
buildings were similarly entitled to a sewer allocation. 245 In addition, 
234 Id. 
235 33 U.S.C. § 1342(h) (1988). The EPA "may proceed in a court of competent jurisdiction 
to restrict or prohibit the introduction of any pollutant into such treatment works by a source 
not utilizing such treatment works prior to the finding that such condition was violated." Id. 
236 United States v. Metropolitan Dist. Comm'n, 757 F. Supp. 121, 129 (D. Mass. 1991), 
afi'd, 930 F.2d 132 (1st Cir. 1991). 
237 878 F.2d 725 (3d Cir. 1989). 
238 Id. at 727. 
239 Id. 
240 Id. 
241 Id. 
242 830 F.2d 1107 (11th Cir. 1987). 
243 Id. at 1112-14. 
244 Id. at 1108-09. 
246 Id. at 1112. E & T Realty was not entitled to a sewer allocation according to the terms 
of the moratorium resolution. Accordingly, only if E & T Realty could show that the landlord 
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the Eleventh Circuit required a showing of intentional discrimination 
to maintain an equal protection claim.246 Accordingly, the court re-
manded the case for further findings consistent with the higher 
standards it had outlined. 247 
5. Receivership 
Another remedy available to the judiciary is the appointment of a 
receiver to manage a noncompliant facility.248 Courts generally grant 
receivers wide-ranging authority, including the power to borrow 
funds, hire consultants, and manage all operations of the facility 
under their control.249 For example, in Morgan v. McDonough,250 
the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit upheld the 
appointment of a receiver to oversee all aspects of the desegregation 
of the Boston School District.251 Similarly, in United States v. City 
of Detroit, 252 the United States District Court for the Eastern Dis-
trict of Michigan appointed the Mayor of Detroit as a receiver and 
charged him with the administration of that city's noncompliant 
sewage treatment plant.253 The district court pointed to the futility 
of other enforcement measures in this particular case to justify its 
resort to receivership as an enforcement mechanism. 254 
6. Contempt 
Perhaps the most traditional means of coercing compliance with a 
structural injunction is to hold the violator in contempt of court. 255 
Because the fundamental purpose of a civil contempt sanction is to 
of the other building also was not entitled to a sewer allocation would the two applicants be 
similarly situated for equal protection purposes. [d. 
246 [d. 
247 [d. at 1114-15. 
248 See Noncompliant Treatment Works, supra note 35, at 932. 
249 See id. at 932 n.208. 
260 540 F.2d 527 (1st Cir. 1976). 
261 [d. at 533. 
262 476 F. Supp 512 (E.D. Mich. 1979). 
263 [d. at 521. 
254 [d. at 520. 
Where "[t]he more usual remedies---contempt proceedings and further injunctions-
[are] plainly not very promising as they [invite] further confrontation and delay; and 
when the usual remedies are inadequate, a court of equity is justified, particularly 
in aid of an outstanding injunction, in turning to less common ones, such as receiv-
ership, to get the job done." 
[d. (quoting Morgan v. McDonough, 540 F.2d 527, 533 (1st Cir. 1976». 
266 Hirschhorn, supra note 168, at 1826. 
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compel compliance with a court order,256 courts may employ the 
mechanism only against those parties possessing a present ability to 
comply with such an order.257 For example, in Delaware Valley 
Citizens' Council,258 when the Pennsylvania legislature refused to 
appropriate funds for an emissions control program, the United 
States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit upheld the district 
court's decision to hold in contempt the executive officials responsible 
for implementing the program.259 The terms of the consent decree 
in Delaware Valley Citizens' Council specifically bound both the 
commonwealth of Pennsylvania and its "officers, agents, employees 
and successors of said parties."260 Accordingly, the appeals court saw 
no bar to affirming the district court's contempt declaration. 261 
Courts sometimes have been reluctant, however, to pursue con-
tempt proceedings against officials in charge of noncompliant insti-
tutions. In Spallone v. United States,262 for example, the Supreme 
Court refused to hold officials of the city of Yonkers in contempt. 263 
In Spallone, the United States District Court for the Southern 
District of N ew York had held members of the Yonkers City Council 
in contempt for refusing to vote for an affordable housing ordinance 
to end discriminatory practices in the location of low-income housing 
as required by a prior consent decree.264 The Supreme Court rea-
soned that contempt sanctions against Yonkers alone would accom-
plish the desired result, and accordingly ruled that the district court 
had abused its discretion in applying contempt sanctions to city 
council members as well. 265 Furthermore, the Court found that the 
imposition of large fines on legislators encouraged them to vote with 
a view toward their personal well-being and not with a view toward 
the best interests of the city.266 The Court concluded that such fines 
represented an impermissible intrusion on the legislative process.267 
Similarly, in New York State Association for Retarded Children 
v. Carey,268 the United States District Court for the Eastern District 
256 [d. at 1828. 
267 [d. 
258 678 F.2d 470 (3d Cir. 1982). 
269 [d. at 479. 
260 [d. at 475. 
261 See id. at 479. 
262 110 S. Ct. 625 (1990). 
263 [d. at 634. 
264 [d. at 630. 
265 [d. at 634. 
266 [d. 
267 [d. 
268 631 F.2d 162 (2d Cir. 1980). 
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of New York directed the state of New York to make certain im-
provements in a state institution for mentally retarded persons and 
finance a review panel to oversee these improvements. 269 In violation 
of the order, the state legislature refused to provide funds for the 
review pane1.270 The United States Court of Appeals for the Second 
Circuit, however, reversed the subsequent district court decision 
holding the state's governor and comptroller in contempt,271 because 
the language of the original consent decree qualified the obligations 
of the executive officials as being subject to whatever legislative 
approval might be required.272 It is also important to note in this 
case that the requirement of a review panel would not ensure directly 
that the violations would be corrected, but the panel was merely a 
step in that direction.273 Thus, the failure of New York's executive 
officials did not perpetuate directly the violations that the decree 
addressed. 
Generally, contempt proceedings involving consent decrees issued 
to facilitate CW A compliance are civil as opposed to criminal con-
tempt proceedings.274 A unique feature of civil contempt is that the 
contemner is afforded a chance to purge the contempt. 275 In other 
words, contemners must be given an opportunity to correct their 
wrongs and thereby avoid remaining in contempt. 276 
E. The Supreme Court Endorses Judicial Power 
To Tax: Missouri v. Jenkins 
In the absence of indirect coercion techniques, courts must look 
to more direct methods of ordering the financing necessary to bring 
about POTW compliance. On April 18, 1990, the United States Su-
preme Court, in a 5-4 vote, held that a federal court possesses the 
power to tax in certain circumstances. 277 In Missouri v. Jenkins,278 
the Court was confronted with the segregated school system of the 
Kansas City, Missouri School District (KCMSD).279 In 1985, the 
269 [d. at 163. 
270 [d. at 164. 
271 See id. at 166. 
212 [d. at 163. 
213 See id. at 166. 
274 See, e.g., United States v. City of Providence, 492 F. Supp. 602, 610 (D.R.1. 1980). 
276 [d. 
276 [d. 
277 Missouri v. Jenkins, 110 S. Ct. 1651, 1666 (1990). 
278 110 S. Ct. 1651 (1990). 
279 [d. at 1655. 
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United States District Court for the Western District of Missouri 
had issued an order detailing both a desegregation plan for the 
KCMSD and the financing necessary to implement it.28O The district 
court also concluded that certain provisions of Missouri state law 
limiting local property tax levies would prohibit the KCMSD from 
raising the funds necessary to comply with the order.281 Accordingly, 
after determining that the KCMSD had exhausted all other possible 
sources of revenue, the district court ordered the KCMSD property 
tax levy increased to exceed state law limitations through the 1991-
1992 fiscal year. 282 
On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth 
Circuit affirmed the district court's setting of a property tax rate for 
the KCMSD, concluding that federal courts do have the power to 
tax.283 The appeals court noted, however, that in the future, in 
keeping with principles of federal/state comity,284 a district court 
should not set the actual tax rate but rather should direct the com-
munity to submit a tax levy proposal to the state and then enjoin 
the operation of the state laws that limit such a levy. 285 
In upholding judicial taxation in this case, the Supreme Court 
majority began its analysis by stating that principles of comity must 
temper a district court's exercise of its equitable discretion.286 The 
majority cautioned that while a district court's remedial powers must 
be adequate to address the task before it, these powers are not 
unlimited.287 The Court noted that respect for the integrity of local 
governmental units should be a prime consideration in evaluating 
the prudence of granting an injunction that compels a tax levy. 288 
This consideration holds especially true when, but for a contradictory 
state law, local officials are willing and able to correct the existing 
constitutional wrong. 289 
280 [d. at 1656. 
281 [d. 
282 [d. at 1658. 
283 [d. 
284 [d. Although a federal district court may have authority to implement its orders by 
directing a tax levy, principles of federal/state comity provide that "maximum consideration 
should be given the views of the state and local officials concerned so long as they appear 
compatible with the goals to be achieved." United States v. Missouri, 515 F.2d 1365, 1373 
(8th Cir. 1975). Accordingly, if it is possible, courts should give state and local officials 
deference on exactly how to implement a tax levy or bond issuance. See Jenkins, 110 S. Ct. 
at 1658-59. 
285 Jenkins, 110 S. Ct. at 1658-59. 
286 [d. at 1662-63. 
287 [d. at 1663. 
288 [d. 
289 [d. 
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The majority went on to cite Griffin v. County School Board of 
Prince Edward County290 for the proposition that "a court order 
directing a local government body to levy its own taxes is plainly a 
judicial act within the power of a federal court. "291 Using Griffin as 
a springboard, the majority affirmed the decision of the appeals court 
and held specifically that a federal court may order a local govern-
ment with taxing authority to levy taxes in excess of state statutory 
limits when there is a constitutional ground for not observing those 
state limits. 292 
In a powerfully written opinion, Justice Kennedy, joined by three 
other justices, disagreed with the majority's holding with regard to 
judicial taxation.293 Justice Kennedy used the principle that local 
governmental bodies derive their power from the sovereign state as 
the foundation for his analysis.294 He further pointed out that state 
laws, including taxation provisions, define the actual powers of a 
body such as the KCMSD.295 Accordingly, Justice Kennedy argued 
that it did not matter whether local officials themselves were willing 
to comply, and that the real issue the case presented was the con-
stitutional validity of judicial taxation. 296 
Justice Kennedy noted that nowhere in the constitutional descrip-
tion of judicial powers is there any mention of the word "tax. "297 
Yet, the list of legislative powers outlined in the Constitution298 
begins with the power to "lay and collect taxes."299 Thus he argued 
that only Congress, not the courts, had the power to levy taxes. 300 
Justice Kennedy further argued that judicial taxation constitutes a 
denial of due process.301 According to Justice Kennedy, such an 
exercise of equitable discretion violates the requirement of notice to 
citizens and deprives them of the right to be heard.302 Finally, he 
asserted that the majority misinterpreted the holding of Griffin. 303 
Arguing that Griffin endorsed the power of a federal court to order 
290 377 U.S. 218, 233 (1964) (upholding district court order requiring local officials to levy 
taxes to maintain school system sufficiently free from racial discrimination). 
291 Jenkins, 110 S. Ct. at 1665. 
292 Id. at 1666. 
298 Id. at 1667 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment). 
294 Id. at 11\70 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment). 
296 Id. 
296 Id. 
29'1Id. 
288 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, el. 1. 
2119 Jenkins, 110 S. Ct. at 1671 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment). 
IlOO Id. 
801 Id. at 1670 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment). 
801! Id. at 1671 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment). 
808 See id. at 1673 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment). 
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a local authority merely to exercise an existing power to tax , 304 
Justice Kennedy concluded that there were no grounds for the ma-
jority's support of judicial taxation because the KCMSD had no state 
authority to tax in the first place. 305 
Justice Kennedy concluded the minority opinion by warning that 
there was nothing in the majority decision to prevent the exercise 
of judicial taxation from spreading beyond the realm of constitution-
ally mandated desegregation cases. 306 He lamented that the Court 
had initiated "a process that over time could threaten fundamental 
alteration of the form of government our Constitution embodies. "307 
F. Tke Irnpact oftke State Liability Provision oftke CWA 
The specific issue presented by Jenkins-the propriety of a federal 
court ordering a municipality to levy taxes in excess of state law 
limitations-cannot arise under CW A proceedings. Congress pre-
cluded this possibility by providing that states would be liable for 
municipal violations to the extent that state law prevents a munici-
pality from raising the revenues necessary for CW A compliance. 308 
Congress designed this provision to prevent states from shielding 
municipalities from enforcement of the CW A by limiting municipal-
ities' ability to raise revenues. 309 
In United States v. City of Hopewell ,310 the United States District 
Court for the Eastern District of Virginia observed that the CWA 
state liability provision contemplated joining a state as a party de-
fendant and not as a party plaintiff.3ll In City of Hopewell, the 
United States brought suit against Hopewell, the commonwealth of 
Virginia, and certain industrial offenders for NPDES permit viola-
tions.312 Virginia, however, joined the action as a plaintiff seeking 
304 Id. 
306 Id. at 1675 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment). 
300 See id. at 1678 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment). 
30'1 Id. at 1679 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment). 
308 33 U.S.C. § 1319(e) (1988). 
Id. 
Whenever a municipality is a party to a civil action brought by the United States 
under this section, the State in which such municipality is located shall be joined as 
a party. Such State shall be liable for payment of any judgment, or any expenses 
incurred as a result of complying with any judgment, entered against the municipality 
in such action to the extent that the laws of that State prevent the municipality from 
raising revenues needed to comply with such judgment. 
809 See United States v. Duracen Int'l, Inc., 510 F. Supp. 154, 156 (M.D. Tenn. 1981). 
310 508 F. Supp. 526 (E.D. Va. 1980). 
311 Id. at 527. 
312 Id. 
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punitive action against Hopewell.313 In granting Hopewell's motion 
to dismiss the commonwealth as a party plaintiff, the court held that 
Virginia's statutory legal interest was to provide funds to meet any 
judgment against the municipal violator, and that this role consti-
tuted a defendant's position.314 Accordingly, the court reasoned that 
it lacked jurisdiction to entertain Virginia's claim as a party plain-
tiff. 315 
States and municipalities have challenged the CWA state liability 
provision on the grounds that it violates their Tenth Amendment 
right to shield their municipalities from liability by limiting the 
municipalities' ability to raise revenues.316 For example, in United 
States v. Plaquemines Parish Mosquito Control District,317 the 
United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that re-
quiring local governmental compliance with the CWA does not vio-
late the Tenth Amendment.318 In this case, the district court granted 
the EPA an injunction enjoining Plaquemines Parish from carrying 
out dredging activities without a permit under the CWA.319 
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit denied 
Plaquemines Parish's Tenth Amendment challenge320 using the 
three-part test that the Supreme Court set out in Hodel v. Virginia 
Suiface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n.321 In Virginia SUiface Min-
ing, the Court determined that congressional commerce power leg-
islation violates the Tenth Amendment if it regulates the states as 
states; it addresses matters that are indisputably matters of state 
sovereignty; and states' compliance with the federal law directly 
would impair their ability to "structure integral operations in areas 
of traditional functions."322 The Fifth Circuit in Plaquemines Parish 
determined that the CWA regulated individuals and businesses as 
well as states and their political subdivisions and therefore did not 
meet the first part of the Virginia SUiface Mining test.323 
313 Id. 
314 I d. at 528. 
315 Id. 
316 U.S. CONST. amend. X. The Tenth Amendment states that "[t]he powers not delegated 
to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to 
the States respectively, or to the people." Id. 
817 16 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1649 (5th Cir. 1981). 
818 Id. at 1652. 
319 Id. at 1650. 
3110 Id. at 1651-52. 
821 452 U.S. 264,287-88 (1981). 
822 Id. 
823 Plaquemines Parish Mosquito Control Dist., 16 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) at 1651. 
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The court also rejected Plaquemines Parish's reliance on National 
League of Cities v. U sery324 to support the proposition that the CWA 
violated the Tenth Amendment. 325 The Fifth Circuit pointed to the 
concurrence of Justice Blackmun in National League of Cities, which 
stated that the majority opinion in that case did not "outlaw federal 
power in areas such as environmental protection, where the federal 
interest is demonstrably greater. "326 
Similarly, in United States v. Duracell International, Inc.,327 the 
United States District Court for the Middle District of Tennessee 
struck down a Tenth Amendment challenge to the CW A state lia-
bility provision.328 The court observed that the provision does not 
impose strict liability on a state. 329 Accordingly, because only state 
interference with municipal compliance is regulated, and because 
environmental protection is a federal interest and not an integral 
state governmental function, the court determined that the state 
liability provision does not violate the Tenth Amendment. 330 
In Duracell, the state of Tennessee also claimed that the state 
liability provision violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment because it was arbitrary and capricious.331 The court 
held that congressional concern for water pollution control justified 
the CWA as neither arbitrary nor capricious. 332 Furthermore, the 
court explained that congressional power to regulate pollution nec-
essarily includes the power to enforce such regulations, even against 
the states. 333 
III. A PROPOSED STRATEGY FOR ENFORCING POTW COMPLIANCE 
WITH CONSENT DECREES 
A. Potential Solutions Through Indirect Coercion Techniques 
Because of the shortcomings of the penalties provided in the 
CWA,334 the extremely limited number of situations in which courts 
324 426 u.s. 833 (1976). 
326 Plaquemines Parish Mosquito Control Dist., 16 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) at 1651-52. 
326 426 U.S. at 856. 
327 510 F. Supp. 154 (M.D. Tenn. 1981). 
328 [d. at 156-57. 
329 [d. at 157. 
330 [d. at 156-57. 
331 [d. at 157. 
332 [d. 
33S [d. 
334 See supra notes 50-64 and accompanying text. 
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modify consent decrees,335 and the sensitive separation of powers 
and federalism issues that go hand in hand with judicial taxation or 
bond issuance,336 courts likely will enjoy the most success by using 
indirect enforcement tools to compel compliance with CWA require-
ments. The effectiveness of the various coercive enforcement mech-
anisms may vary widely depending upon the specific mechanism 
chosen and the particular fact pattern confronting the court. 
1. Ineffective Coercive Techniques for CWA Compliance: 
Contempt and Sequestration 
Some of the traditional indirect coercion techniques used to compel 
compliance with structural injunctions will be ineffective in compel-
ling compliance with CWA consent decrees. One example of an in-
effective mode of indirect judicial coercion is holding the executive 
officials responsible for the implementation of consent decrees in 
contempt. The very reason that the EPA began to favor judicial 
remedies was because judicial orders carried with them the prospect 
of local authorities being held in contempt of court for noncompli-
ance.337 Holding local government officials in contempt, however, 
appears to be a remedy that courts are reluctant to pursue in prac-
tice.338 
Judicial reluctance to use contempt orders to enforce compliance 
may result from the apparent unfairness of holding a local official in 
contempt when the root of the noncompliance lies at the state level. 
Courts may choose to circumvent inequity of this nature by making 
use of statutory provisions for state liability,339 but additional im-
pediments to the effectiveness of contempt proceedings remain. 
Courts are often hesitant to initiate contempt proceedings because 
they create additional confrontation and delay that is generally coun-
terproductive to the original objectives of the consent decree, such 
as keeping a project on schedule.340 Moreover, due to the civil nature 
of proceedings pursuant to decrees mandating CWA compliance, 
contemners must be given an opportunity to purge their contempt. 341 
Because an opportunity to purge in this scenario is the functional 
885 See supra notes 188-203 and accompanying text. 
3S6 See supra notes 277~07 and accompanying text. 
387 See Enforcement Strategy, supra note 31, at 1437 (EPA favored shift from administrative 
to judicial remedies because administrative orders are too easily circumvented). 
388 See, e.g., United States v. City of Providence, 492 F. Supp. 602, 610 (D.R.I. 1980). 
388 33 U.S.C. § 1319 (1988). 
8CO See, e.g., Morgan v. McDonough, 540 F.2d 527,533 (1st Cir. 1976). 
841 See supra notes 274-76 and accompanying text. 
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equivalent of an extension of the consent decree, the purpose of 
contempt proceedings seems to be defeated in situations involving 
POTW noncompliance. 
Historically, the primary value of contempt proceedings has been 
to prod state or local officials to do what is necessary to bring about 
compliance.342 Local officials now may feel insulated from possible 
contempt proceedings, however, in the wake of the Spallone deci-
sion, in which the Supreme Court permitted a contempt sanction 
against the city of Yonkers but not against the individual city council 
members. 343 In any event, holding a governmental officer responsible 
for a multi-million-dollar treatment facility does not bring that facil-
ity any closer to compliance with federal standards. In practical 
terms therefore, contempt proceedings offer only minimal assistance 
to courts attempting to enforce POTW compliance with consent de-
crees. 
The effectiveness of sequestration of federal funds by a court 
apparently turns on two main considerations. First, there must be 
some link between the withheld funds and the injury that the in-
junction is designed to correct. 344 Second, the court must balance 
the good that coercing the noncompliant community to comply will 
achieve against any collateral harm that the withholding of the fed-
eral funds may cause.345 Applying these considerations to the case 
of communities with POTW s that fail to comply with CWA stan-
dards, it becomes apparent that sequestration will be a viable rem-
edy in only a very limited number of situations. To apply this tech-
nique a court first must find within the violating community a 
recipient of federal funding that is a contributor to the water pollu-
tion in question. Unlike air pollution, which knows no geographical 
boundaries, proof of a point source of water pollution requires much 
more detailed analysis.346 Collecting evidence of this sort may turn 
out to be very expensive and time-consuming. 
342 See Hirschhorn, supra note 168, at 1826. 
343 See supra notes 262-67 and accompanying text. 
344 See, e.g., Delaware Valley Citizens' Council v. Pennsylvania, 678 F.2d 470, 478 (3d Cir. 
1982). The use of federal highway funds directly would contribute to air pollution, the very 
problem that the injunction requiring an automobile emissions standard program sought to 
alleviate. [d. 
345 See, e.g., Gautreaux v. Romney, 457 F.2d 124, 127 (7th Cir. 1972) (harm caused to low-
income families by withholding funds outweighed possible good of coercing Chicago into 
constructing public housing). 
346 33 U.S.C. § 1362(14) (1988). "The term 'point source' means any discernible, confined 
and discrete conveyance, including but not limited to any pipe, ditch, channel, tunnel, conduit, 
well, discrete fissure, container, rolling stock, concentrated animal feeding operation, or vessel 
or other floating craft, from which pollutants are or may be discharged." [d. 
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In rare circumstances, certain factual situations may arise that 
clearly identify a recipient of federal funding as a source of water 
pollution. For example, highway funds in some cases may contribute 
to runoff that directly carries pollutants into a watercourse. Addi-
tionally, funds for public housing may prove to place an additional 
strain on a noncompliant treatment system and therefore may be a 
candidate for sequestration. Some courts, however, have required a 
strong showing that the sequestered funds contribute to the exact 
injury that the consent decree addresses.347 It is also important to 
remember that even when a direct link exists, the court still must 
apply a benefit-versus-harm analysis. For example, a court may 
sequester housing funds only if the benefit of the reduced strain on 
the noncompliant treatment facility outweighs the collateral harm to 
the beneficiaries of those funds, the individuals who need housing. 
Because it applies only to an extremely limited number of situations, 
sequestration, like contempt proceedings, fails to provide courts with 
an effective tool for compelling POTW compliance with the CWA. 
2. Potentially Effective Coercive Techniques for CWA Compliance: 
Receivership and Moratoriums 
Receivership is a method of coercing compliance that, although 
somewhat extreme, sometimes may be well suited to the problem of 
a noncompliant POTW. A court-appointed receiver is often an ex-
ecutive official of the violating community.348 Because appointment 
as a receiver puts the official under court direction, that official would 
gain the ability to manage the noncompliant facility while remaining 
above political pressures,349 which often are a major cause of non-
compliance. Furthermore, the official-turned-receiver would possess 
the power to borrow the necessary funds to finance compliance. 350 
This power seems to allow receivers to circumvent the problem of 
state laws that limit property taxes. Another advantage of receiv-
ership is that it does not carry with it the potential of harm to the 
offending community that accompanies, for example, sequestra-
tion. 351 Moreover, receivership is particularly adaptable to municipal 
347 See, e.g., Delaware Valley Citizens' Council, 678 F.2d at 478-79 (Pennsylvania legisla-
ture could have corrected collateral harm from impoundment of highway funds by appropri-
ating funds necessary to facilitate compliance with consent decree). 
34B See, e.g., United States v. City of Detroit, 720 F.2d 443, 445 (6th eir. 1983). 
349 See United States v. City of Detroit, 476 F. Supp. 512, 521 (E.D. Mich. 1979). 
360 See Noncompliant Treatment Works, supra note 35, at 932 n.208. 
361 [d. at 933. 
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offenders.352 Because receivership is a more realistic alternative than 
sequestration or contempt proceedings, municipalities that at one 
time considered themselves immune from enforcement now may be 
wary of this technique of compelling compliance. 353 
On the other hand, receiverships essentially compel communities 
to issue bonds or levy taxes indirectly by empowering the receiver 
to do so. Therefore, in cases in which municipalities can achieve 
compliance only through increased borrowing or taxing, courts 
merely are avoiding the complications of a direct court order by 
using a receiver as a buffer. It is highly questionable whether courts 
should be permitted to avoid the implications of the Supreme Court's 
decision in J enkins354 through the manipulation of legal techniques. 
In many cases, the local officials whom the receiver would replace 
are willing to comply with the CWA but cannot because of a lack of 
federal or state financial assistance.355 
Although courts are unlikely to order the shutdown of a treatment 
facility, because of the logistical and health consequences,356 mora-
toriums on new sewer connections appear to be a more promising 
remedy. Courts can justify resorting to moratorium orders easily 
because the CWA expressly provides for the remedy.357 Further-
more, unlike shutdowns, which would compound pollution problems, 
moratoriums withstand logical scrutiny because they prohibit the 
introduction of additional pollutants into a noncompliant system. To 
date, courts have upheld moratoriums in the face of numerous chal-
lenges. 358 
State and local reactions to moratorium orders demonstrate their 
potential effectiveness. For example, the sewer moratorium imposed 
on the MWRA on February 25, 1991 had the potential to affect up 
to one hundred projects per month in the cities and towns that the 
moratorium order covered. 359 Such an impact can be devastating to 
the economy of an area and serve as a strong incentive to bring 
about CWA compliance. By March 15, 1991, less than three weeks 
after the court issued the moratorium order, the city of Boston 
352 Id. 
S53 Id. 
354 See supra notes 277-307 and accompanying text. 
856 See Franklin, supra note 12, at 20. 
356 See supra notes 222-25 and accompanying text. 
367 33 u.s.c. § 1342(h) (1988). 
358 See supra notes 226-47 and accompanying text. 
369 James L. Franklin, Judge Halts Sewer Hookups; Pushes State on Harbor Landfill, 
BOSTON GLOBE, Feb. 26, 1991, at 1, 24. 
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already had requested hardship exemptions from the moratorium 
for twenty-nine projects in an attempt to maintain some economic 
development within the city. 360 
There are, however, limits to the effectiveness of moratoriums. 
For example, moratoriums such as the order against the MWRA, 
that are directed at state officials, may have a crippling effect on 
those, such as the city of Boston, who are powerless to address the 
situation that the order seeks to correct. 361 Furthermore, courts have 
used moratoriums primarily to overcome specific compliance prob-
lems, such as the timely transfer of land for a landfill. Courts have 
yet to employ moratorium:" in situations where widespread noncom-
pliance is due to a lack of funds. In these cases, the financial conse-
quences of raising the funds necessary for compliance may outweigh 
the economic incentive that the moratorium supplies. This is espe-
cially true in areas that are primarily residential and do not expe-
rience much industrial or commercial growth. Finally, moratoriums 
imposed for extended periods of time may. be more susceptible to 
constitutional challenges by those affected than previous unsuccess-
ful claims. 
Despite their limitations, indirect coercion techniques such as mor-
atoriums and receiverships provide courts with a significant degree 
of enforcement power. Many cases of POTW noncompliance stem 
from pressure exerted on local officials not to increase taxes or utility 
rates. Each of these indirect coercion techniques attacks the political 
nature of many POTW noncompliance problems. Receiverships, for 
example, sever the management of a noncompliant facility from the 
political decisionmaking process. This separation aims to overcome 
politically motivated reluctance to generate the funds necessary for 
compliance. In contrast, moratoriums compel compliance by placing 
increased pressure on those responsible for political decisions. Mor-
atoriums effectively halt the economic growth of a noncompliant 
community. Because many noncompliant communities depend on 
new economic growth for relief from present economic difficulties, 
officials responsible for noncompliance feel increased pressure ex-
peditiously to generate the funding necessary for POTW compliance. 
If nothing else, the mere threat of receivership or moratoriums 
360 James L. Franklin, EPA Seeks Wider Ban on Sewer Hookups, BOSTON GLOBE, Mar. 
15, 1991, at 21. 
361 See supra notes 226--36 and accompanying text. Compliance with the MWRA order 
required the state legislature to vote to transfer land to the MWRA. City of Boston officials 
therefore were powerless in this situation. I d. 
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should provide local officials with sufficient incentive to seriously 
consider the long-term financial requirements of treatment facilities. 
B. The Necessity of Direct Court Orders 
Because indirect coercion techniques are not always successful in 
compelling compliance with CWA consent decrees, there is a need 
for courts to utilize their equitable powers by issuing direct orders 
to compel compliance. The most effective type of direct court order 
to combat financially motivated POTW noncompliance is an injunc-
tion mandating a bond issuance or a tax levy against the noncom-
pliant community. To date, however, courts have been reluctant to 
issue orders of this nature. 
1. Special Cases Favoring Direct Court Orders 
There are at least two scenarios in which courts seem more willing 
to exercise their equitable discretion directly. The first scenario is 
when private individuals have initiated the enforcement proceed-
ings. 362 In a limited number of cases in which discrimination against 
private citizens exists, courts have issued direct orders that require 
noncompliant communities to spend bond proceeds in a particular 
manner.363 No court, however, has circumvented the general require-
ment of a public vote for bond issuance. Therefore, while courts are 
willing to compel the sale of issued bonds, the question of compelling 
bond issuance is analyzed best through a comparison with judicial 
taxation. 364 
A second scenario in which courts recently have issued direct 
orders as a means of compelling compliance is when noncompliance 
has lingered for a significant period of time, and when the initial 
court order clearly contemplated some type of funding, whether 
federal, state, or local.365 In Allen Park, the court compelled pre-
viously promised federal funding in exactly this type of situation. 366 
Although courts have been willing to order federal funding, amend-
ments to the CWA have shifted much of the financial burden to 
states and municipalities. 367 Accordingly, it is now necessary for 
S62 See Inverness Forest Improvement Dist. v. Hardy St. Investors, 541 S.W.2d 454 (Tex. 
Civ. App. 1976). 
363 See, e.g., id. at 462. 
364 See supra notes 277-307. 
866 See Michigan v. City of Allen Park, 739 F. Supp. 1102, 1106 (E.D. Mich. 1990). 
366 See id. at 1106. 
S61 See supra notes 77-94 and accompanying text. 
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federal courts to order previously contemplated state or local funding 
to prevent POTW noncompliance. 
There are two possible definitional problems that may arise, how-
ever, in the direct ordering of funding in noncompliant POTW cases. 
First, how long must noncompliance persist before such an order is 
permissible? Second, how "clearly" must the initial court order have 
contemplated the funding in question? 
With regard to the duration of time question, in all likelihood by 
the time such a case reaches the appellate level, noncompliance will 
have persisted for a significant amount of time. Even if this is not 
the case, the determining factor in answering this question probably 
will be whether the noncompliant governmental unit still is putting 
forth earnest efforts to obtain funding or, for all practical purposes, 
has given up. 
The second question spawns much more controversy than the first. 
It seems fair to say that if an initial court order mentions particular 
funding mechanisms, those mechanisms were "clearly" contemplated 
by the order. This question is much more difficult to answer if a 
court can infer the contemplation of only certain sources of funds 
from the language of the initial order. For example, suppose a POTW 
compliance order provides for fifty percent of the project to be 
funded by an EPA construction grant and twenty-five percent of the 
project to be funded by a state grant. Can a court infer that such 
an order "clearly" contemplated by the local governmental unit to 
provide financing for the remaining twenty-five percent of the proj-
ect? This question may turn on the number and availability of alter-
native financing options. Thus, courts should evaluate such infer-
ences on a case-by-case basis. 
2. The Impact of the Jenkins Decision 
Aside from isolated cases involving discrimination against private 
individuals and funding contemplated by previous court orders, 
courts have not resorted to direct orders to compel POTW compli-
ance with the CWA. Furthermore, the Supreme Court's decision in 
J enkins368 probably will not provide courts with justification to issue 
direct orders that compel tax levies in order to fund noncompliant 
POTWs. Although the Supreme Court's ruling in Jenkins empowers 
a federal court to order a municipality to levy taxes,369 the situation 
368 Missouri v. Jenkins, 110 S. Ct. 1651 (1990). 
369 See supra notes 277...!J07 and accompanying text. 
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becomes more complex when a state law limits a community's rev-
enue-raising ability. 
The Jenkins minority asserted that judicial taxation controverting 
existing state law was unconstitutional on separation of powers and 
federalism grounds. According to the minority, the power to tax was 
a legislative and not a judicial power. 370 The position of the Jenkins 
majority, however, can be read in two ways. According to Justice 
Kennedy, there are virtually no limits placed upon the majority's 
endorsement of judicial taxation. 371 If a court upholds this interpre-
tation of the decision, then there is apparently no bar to judicial 
taxation under the CWA even in the face of a state law limiting local 
revenue-raising power. A federal district court would be entitled to 
order a municipality to levy taxes to the extent that state law 
permitted and then invoke the liability provision, thus requiring the 
state somehow to provide the balance of the necessary funds. 
In contrast, the Jenkins majority stated that its decision was 
limited to situations involving a constitutional violation. The majority 
emphasized that school desegregation cases were special situations 
involving constitutional violations. Accordingly, absent a constitu-
tional violation, a federal court could not order a local tax levy that 
exceeded state statutory limitations. In general, noncompliance with 
the CWA does not violate the Constitution. As a result, the major-
ity's limitation of the Jenkins decision seems to close the door on 
judicial taxation in POTW noncompliance cases. 
It is difficult to assess how the Jenkins decision might affect the 
case of court-ordered bond issues. On one hand, it seems that the 
power to tax-to remove money directly from the taxpayers' pock-
ets--deserves stricter scrutiny than the issue of long-term borrow-
ing. It is important to note, however, that while taxation is a power 
that local officials may exercise directly, bond issuances in many 
cases require voter approval. 
Federal courts are not likely to attempt to apply the holding in 
Jenkins to CWA enforcement cases in the near future. The Jenkins 
majority prevailed only by a slim 5-4 margin. Furthermore, since 
the time of the decision, Justices Souter and Thomas have replaced 
Justices Brennan and Marshall, who were both members of the 
majority. Moreover, the minority opinion indicated in no uncertain 
terms that courts should not consider the Jenkins decision solid 
precedent for subsequent decisions. In fact, the United States Court 
370 See supra notes 293--307 and accompanying text. 
371 See supra notes 293--307 and accompanying text. 
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of Appeals for the First Circuit recently cited Jenkins in support of 
the proposition that, in fashioning court orders, federal courts should 
avoid interference with state sovereignty. 372 
IV. CONCLUSION 
In passing the CWA, Congress not only set ambitious goals for 
eliminating water pollution but also created a need for ambitious 
funding efforts. Almost immediately after passage of the CWA, 
however, the federal government began to hedge on its commitment 
to provide financing for mandated projects. During the 1980s, Con-
gress gradually began to phase out federal funding for CWA proj-
ects, and will eliminate federal funding entirely by 1994. As a result, 
the enormous financial burden of eliminating wastewater pollution 
has shifted to state and local goverments. 
In the meantime, to achieve POTW compliance with the CWA, 
the EPA developed a strategy that featured judicial enforcement. 
As a result, federal courts now must adopt methods of compelling 
economically strapped state and local governments to bring POTW s 
in compliance with CWA requirements. Although the CWA includes 
provisions for fining noncompliant POTWs, fines have proven espe-
cially ineffective when the reason for noncompliance has been a lack 
of sufficient funds. In these situations, local officials are reluctant to 
make a politically unpopular decision to raise taxes or increase sewer 
rates. Courts therefore should develop creative techniques for com-
pelling compliance. The most successful coercion techniques will be 
those that harness political pressure and use it to compel funding or 
remove decisions concerning compliance from the political process 
altogether. Accordingly, active judicial coercion through the use of 
receiverships and sewer moratoriums will allow courts to achieve 
significant success in many POTW cases. 
Ultimately, Congress should realize that it is responsible for the 
shortage of funds for POTW projects. To correct the situation, Con-
gress should follow one of two possible paths. Congress could ease 
the financial burden on state and local governments by reinstituting 
some form of federal financial assistance. This course of action indeed 
would be noble but is highly unlikely. In the alternative, Congress 
should give courts the enforcement power they need by statutorily 
sanctioning judicial taxation or bond issuance. 
372 United States v. Metropolitan Dist. Comm'n, 930 F.2d 132, 136--37 (lst Cir. 1991). 
